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STATE OF UTAH 
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DAVIS, a co- partnership, doing 
business as DAY IS NIELSON 
CONSTRUCTION CO~IPANY,and 
CONTINENTAL C A S U A L T Y 
CO)IP ANY, a corporation, 
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vs. 
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PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
7684 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is an action to review a decision of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah awarding compensation to 
the defendant, Keith F. Hubbard, to be paid by the 
plaintiffs. There are two different accidents involving 
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the same injury and the only question involved in thi~ 
case is : Which employer and insurance carrier is liable 
for the payment of compensation~ The employee who 
is the defendant, Keith F. Hubbard, is entitled to com-
pensation either from the plaintiffs or from the defen-
dant, Western Asbestos Company, and its insurance 
carrier, The State Insurance Fund. The Industrial Com-
mission determined that the plaintiffs are liable for 
the compensation. The plaintiffs believe that the decision 
is wrong and :that the defendants, Western Asbestos 
Company and The State Insurance Fund are respon-
sible for the payment ·of the compensation. 
A hearing was held in this case before the Industrial 
Commission, F~bruary 1, 1951; ·the Commission rendered 
its decision March 13, 195:1. The plaintiffs herein peti-
tioned for rehearing, March 15,~ ~951, which 'petition for 
rehearing was denied by the Commission April ,6, 1951. 
(R. 80-86) Plaintiffs herein petitioned this Court 
May 1, 1951 for a writ of certiorari which was issued 
by this Court and served on the defendants the same 
day. (R. 89) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On October 24, 194.9, the defendant, Keith F. Hub-
bard, was employed by the defendant, Western Asbestos 
Company, at the salt works near Saltair, in Salt Lake 
County. The State Insurance Fund at that time was 
the insurance carrier for· said company. (R. 19) The 
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application for compensation (R. 9) states that the date 
involved was September, 1949, but the first report of 
injury (R. 1) and the evidence established that the date 
in question is October 2-!, 1949. (R. 19) 
On that date, ~Ir. Hubbard, hereinafter referred to 
as the "employee", a Inan twenty-six years of age, 
was engaged in the work of lifting asbestos sheets and 
beams off a hoist on the fifth floor of a building being 
constructed. The hoist was electrically operated and 
three sheets of asbestos weighing 120 pounds each or 
360 pounds in all were hoisted to the fifth floor where the 
employee was standing on a landing ready to reach out 
and grab the sheets and pull them over to the floor. 
On the day in question it was snowing and wet, and a 
2 by 4 had been erected in front of the shaft for the 
employee to brace himself against while pulling the 
sheets from the hoist to the landing. On the occasion in 
question, the operator of the hoist had prematurely let it 
down before the sheets could be pulled onto the landing. 
They were in danger of slipping off, falling down the 
shaft and endangering the lives of those below. At the 
fifth floor landing Mr. Rice was balancing the sheets 
and the employee was pulling them. Because of the 
premature slacking of the hoist line, the sheets, as 
stated, were dangerously hanging over the shaft and the 
employee braced himself on the 2 by 4 and used great 
effort to pull the sheets over to the landing so they would 
not fall down the shaft. (R. 22-24) He was braced with 
the sheets in his hand and his foot against the 2 by 4. 
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(R. 34) His unusual exertion resulted in a sharp pain 
in the lower part of his back. The employee said to his 
fellow workman "my back is killing me". (R 24, 25) 
The employee first consulted a doctor, Doctor Robinson, 
November 8, 1949, and during the two weeks interval he 
testified on cross examination that his back bothered him 
the entire time. 
Q. "Your back had bothered you the entire time f' 
A. "I would say yes." (R. 37) 
Doctor Robinson, who was consulted by the employee 
for treatment for this injury testified that he saw him 
November 8, 9, 10, 12. (R. 52) Doctor Robinson taped 
the employee's back and diagnosed his injury as low 
back strain which he thought was muscular. (R. 50, 51) 
Doctor Robinson took no x-rays, (R. 52) and on cross 
examination admitted that the injury could have been 
something else than low back strain, and that it is pos-
sible that the employee sustained a herniated disc from 
the accident of October 24; that he could not tell from 
the examination that he made whether or not there was 
a herniated disc at that time. (R. 54) The doctor also 
stated that he has never operated for a herniated disc 
and has not had much experience with herniated discs. 
(R. 53) 
During the period between Octo her 24, and No-
vember 8, a little over two weeks from the date of the 
accident until the employee saw a doctor, the employee 
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testified that he lost no thne from his work, but that his 
back was sore all during the time and that it bothered 
him, (H. 36) that it didn't get any worse and was about 
the same. (R. 37) After finishing the job for Western 
Asbestos Con1pany, X ovember ~-l-, the e1nployee went to 
work for Yell ow Cab and worked about three n1onths 
for that company, and then commenced working for 
plaintiff, Davis Nielson Company, in :March, 1950. (R. 38) 
The Industrial Commission says that the employee 
testified that he felt no pain in the injured area after he 
was released by Doctor Robinson on or about November 
12, 1949 (R. 81). But the employee made statements 
to the contrary. He told his own doctor, Doctor Holbrook, 
that he has had pain in this region since November, 
1949, that it is constantly present, is sharp in character, 
and is well localized. (Exhibit 4 and 5, R. 77-78.) Doctor 
Holbrook testified that these statements were true as 
he received them from the employee (R. 61). The em-
ployee admitted that he had been interviewed by Mr. 
Peterson, a representative of the plaintiff, Continental 
Casualty Company, and that he would not say that Mr. 
Peterson's statement of the interview was incorrect. He 
told Mr. Peterson that after this accident of October 24, 
1949, he limped on his right leg and it was stiff (R. 46). 
Mr. Peterson testified (R. 66) that the employee told 
him that as a result of the accident of October 24, his 
right leg was stiff, he felt pain in the back when he bent 
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over, that he had to limp a little, and that the pain con-
tinued in the same region thereafter until the second 
accident on July 18, 1950. 
On July 18, 1950, the applicant was employed by the 
plaintiff, Davis Nielson Construction Company, whose 
insurance carrier at that time was the plaintiff, Conti-
nental Casualty Company (R. 20-21). In his application 
for compensation (R. 9) the applicant stated that on 
July 26, 1950 he had an accident while employed by 
Davis Nielson Construction Company, but this date was 
established at the hearing as being July 18, 1950, (R. 20) 
a week earlier than alleged in the application for compen-
sation. With reference to the accident of July 18, 1950, 
the employee testified that on that date, about ten o'clock 
in the morning, he was working on Flfth East Street on 
the Ben Albert Apartments; across the street from the 
Ambassador Club, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. · 38) as a 
carpenter, and that ·he .and two other men were carrying 
a form weighing. between 300 and 350 pounds. One man 
was walking backwards, the employee was on the other 
end and the third employee was on the side just balan-
cing it (R. 32). The man walking backwards tripped and 
this kind of flipped the employee up, and when he came 
down there was a sharp pain (R. 33). This pain was in 
the same region as from the accident of October 24, only 
a good deal more sharp and lasting longer. He did not 
feel any pain in his hip right then (R. 27-28). The em-
ployee continued to work the rest of the shift that day 
and the first doctor he went to was a chiropractor, 
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Doctor Carl Larson. He saw Doctor Larson August 1 
(-two weeks after the accident); he didn't go to him 
sooner, because he didn't think it would be necessary. He 
stopped going to Doctor Larson about the 5th of August 
(R. 39) and about ~-\.ugust 11, he saw Doctor Clinger who 
came to his home (R. 28) and told hiin to see Doctor 
Holbrook. He saw Doctor Holbrook the next day. Doctor 
Holbrook states that the employee was seen by him for 
the first time August 1-t, 1950 at which time he took some 
x-rays (R. 56) and examined the employee and concluded 
that the employee had a herniated intervertebral disc 
(R. 78). He saw the employee on quite a few occasions 
and on November 20, 1950, performed an operation and 
determined that the employee "had a large herniated in-
tervertebral disc which was herniated from the spine 
and the lumbo sacral joint of the spine." (R. 58). 
Doctor Holbrook, the employee's own doctor, was 
asked by the employee's attorney, which of the two acci-
dents, that of October 24, 1949 or that of July 18, 1950 
caused the conditions found at the time of the operation. 
He answered, "It would be my opinion under all the cir-
cumstances that the process of degeneration of the inter-
vertebral disc began at the time of the original injury 
and it was further aggravated by the second injury." 
(R. 59). 
Q. "And that the condition that you found at the 
time of the operation on November 20, 1950 
:, would have resulted from one or the other 
or both of these strains 1" 
A. "Yes." (R. 59). 
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On cross examination by the attorney for the 
defendant, The State Insurance Fund, Dr. Holbrook 
testified that the employee told him he continued to 
have some trouble from the time of his original injury 
to the time of the second accident, but that it would make 
no difference, in his opinion, whether he did or didn't 
have pain in his back after the first injury until he had 
the second accident in July; the first accident would still 
be the cause of the trouble. Doctor Holbrook was asked: 
"In other words, he could have been normal so far as 
any pain is concerned between October, 1949 and July, 
1950, and your opinion would still be the same f' A. 
"Yes." (R. 63). He further testified that one of the 
characteristics of a herniated disc is that the pain may 
subside and the patient be symptom free; that in this 
case the disc was degenerated, but he could not tell 
when the degeneration commenced, and that a degenera-
tion of a disc can be due to normal wear and tear or due 
to repeated injuries. He stated that it is also known that 
the anatomical structure of the disc material changes 
normally with the passing of age, that he couldn't tell by 
looking at the disc when the degeneration began. (R. 64, 
65.) 
Doctor Ossman, another leading orthopedic surgeon, 
also testified that a herniated disc is caused by degenera-
tion of the disc material between the bodies of the verte-
brae, that sometimes the progress is quick following a 
strain or injury, and that others receive repeated strains 
and injury before surgical correction is required; that it 
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is assumed the inception of the hernia is traumatic, al-
though that is controversial; that a disc injured by 
trauma may go on to complete herniation without any 
further trauma at all. Asked as to which of the events 
in question, that of October, 1949 or that of 1950 was the 
cause of the herniated disc, the doctor said, "It would be 
reasonable to assume that the initial injury started the 
degeneration unless there was some degeneration there 
before." (R. 67 -68) "and the process probably continued 
to the point of herniation and correction." He stated that 
his opinion would not be different if it could be assumed 
that after the October accident the patient went along 
normally without pain until the second accident. 
The Industrial Commission (R. 81) states that the 
employee testified that he had no pain in the area after 
November 12, 1950. Such testimony is contrary to the 
employee's own admissions as heretofore pointed out to 
Mr. Peterson, and to Doctor Holbrook, his own doctor. 
It is immaterial, however, according to the doctors, in 
determining which accident caused the injury, which was 
corrected by Dr. Holbrook, whether he had or did not 
have pain during the period. And the Industrial Com-
mission expressly finds that after the October accident, 
the employee exhibited symptoms consistent with the 
existence of disc damage (R. 82). 
The Commission, also, in its findings states, "Two 
orthopedic specialists testified that in their opinion, the 
degenerative process which usually culminates in hernia-
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tion was probably initiated by the first injury described 
even though applicant became asymptomatic thereafter. 
The referee therefore finds that applicant's injury of 
October 24, 1949 did such damage to his lumbosacral disc 
that degeneration began." The referee then related the 
event of July 18, 1950 and continued, "The referee 
therefore finds that the condition resulting from appli-
cant's injury of October 24, 1949 was aggravated, an 
extrusion precipiated and the process accelerated by his 
injury of July 18, 1950. This finding is supported by 
the testimony of Doctor Holbrook (Page 14, second hear-
ing) and is not in conflict with Doctor Ossman's testi-
mony." (Italics added.) We find no such testimony on 
Page 14 of the second hearing. The testimony at the 
second hearing commences at Page 48 of the record and 
Page 14 (R. 61) is the testimony of Doctor Holbrook that 
exhibits 4 and 5 (R. 77-78) correctly report the facts as 
stated in the letters; and these letters show that the 
employee told Doctor Holbrook that he had his trouble 
since November, 1949. "While loading some asphalt, he 
had a sudden pain in the low back; with radiation into 
the hip; this pain has been present ever since." On Page 
15 of the second hearing (R. 62) Doctor Holbrook on 
cross examination was asked: 
"Q. Doctor Holbrook, as I understood your an-
swer in the question Mr. McBroom asked in 
his hypothetical question was that the process 
was a degeneration of the intervebral disc 
began at the first injury and was aggravated 
at the second injury. 
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A. That is correct." 
Nor did either doctor testify that the degenerative 
process was probably initiated by the first injury, as 
stated by the Commission (R. 82) nor did Doctor Hol-
brook testify at page 14 of the second hearing or any-
where else that "An extrusion was precipitated and the 
process accelerated by his injury of July 18, 1950." Both 
Doctors Holbrook and Ossman stated that the first acci-
dent was the cause of the rupture, whether the patient 
had pain in the leg afterwards or not. Doctor Holbrook 
stated that the reason that the first accident was the 
cause of the rupture, even though the accident of July, 
1950 caused an immediate and severe strain, was because, 
"We know that one of the characteristics of herniated 
discs is that they may have pain in their backs and that 
may subside and they may be symptom free, and the 
period may vary between weeks and years until the pa-
tient will have no symptoms." 
Q. "What happens to the disc itself 1n those 
periodsf' 
A. "Apparently the disc protruded somewhat 
and pressed on the nerves and then the pres-
sure is relieved by the extruded rna terial 
where it no longer interferes with the nerve 
roots." (R. 64). 
The medical evidence is thus, that the rupture oc-
curred at the first injury and continued thereafter, and 
if the pain subsided it was because the pressure on the 
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nerves by the extruded material was relieved (R. 64). 
Doctor Ossman stated that it is not unusual for a rup-
tured disc to go on to complete herniation without any 
further trauma, or a disc may heal without the necessity 
of mechanical fusion by operative procedure (R. 68). 
ERROR OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Commission was wrong in holding the plaintiffs 
responsible for the payment of compensation in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION WAS WRONG IN HOLDING PLAIN-
TIFFS LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE COMPENSATION 
IN THIS CASE. 
This court some 28 years ago announced the rule in 
line with "the great weight of authority" that "Incapa-
city, which is caused or aggravated by a second injury, 
received while the employee is suffering from another 
injury which he had received in his employment, is the 
result of the first injury." At the same time this court 
also pointed out that the "aggravation theory," the doc-
trine that allows compensation "When an employee is 
suffering from a previous existing diseased bodily con-
dition, and such condition is aggravated by an injury 
suffered by accident while at work, the employer in 
whose services the accident occurs is liable to pay com-
pensation for the resulting disability.", has no applica-
tion in determining which employer is liable where two 
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accidents contribute to the same injury. That case 
clearly points out that the so-called"aggravation theory," 
relied upon by the Industrial Commission in its decision 
in the present case, has no application whatever in the 
present case. The cited case is Continental Casualty 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 63 U. 59, 221 Pac. 
852, decided in 1923. In that case the employee sustained 
an accident July 18, 1922, he was pronounced surgically 
healed, and worked continuously until December 4, 1922, 
on which date he was again injured. The medical evi-
dence was that the December injury was a recurrence of 
the injury of the previous July. The Industrial Com-
mission held that the compensation carrier at the time 
of the second injury was liable. This court said that the 
unavoidable conclusion was that the Commission's find-
ing was not supportted by the evidence. This court in 
reversing the Industrial Commission announced the 
above first-quoted rule as the law in this state in accord-
ance with "the great weight of authority." In its decision 
this court cited Head Drilling Company v. Industrial 
Ace. Comm. 177 Cal. 194, 170 Pac. 157 as one of the 
authorities relied upon. And this court also in a later 
case, Continental Casualty Company v. Industrial Com-
mission 75 U. 220, 284 Pac. 313 (1929), again cited the 
Head Drilling Company case in holding that a prior ac-
cident initiating an injury, later resulting in disability 
upon a recurrence, entitles the employee to compep.sation 
from the one who is the employer at the date of the first 
accident. 
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The so-called "aggravation theory" has no place in 
this case. There is no question though that the employee 
is entitled to compensation. But it is the plaintiffs' con-
tention that the defendant The State Insurance Fund 
is the compensation carrier liable under the undisputed 
facts. The decision of this court in 1923 announced the 
law in this state; that has continued to be the law up to 
the present time, and has been approved many times by 
this and other courts. If the employee had had a degen-
erated disc at the time of the accident of October 24, 
as intimated could be the case by Doctor Ossman, then the 
"aggravation theory" would come into play in determin-
ing whether he was entitled to compensation because the 
accident of October 24 aggravated a pre-existing condi-
tion. That he would be entitled to compensation for such 
accident and inury is not questioned; that would be the 
true application of the "aggravation theory," and the 
compensation carrier liable would be the one who was 
carrying the compensation on October 24, 1949. When a 
second accident aggravates the injury already caused or 
aggravated by the accident of October 24, and in line with 
the pronouncement of this court in 1923 in the Continen-
tal Casualty Company Case supra, plaintiffs contend 
that the compensation carrier at the time of the initial 
injury is the one who must pay the compensation. The 
"aggravation theory" does not determine which of two 
employers is liable where two different accidents occur, 
one of which causes the injury and the other of which 
aggravates it. 
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At this time it seems that further citation of author-
ity would be merely cumulative since there has been no 
overturning of the doctrine announced in 1923 by this 
court in the Continental Casualty case, supra. Ever since 
that decision in 1923, the plaintiff, Continental Casualty 
Company, where it has been the first insurer, has paid 
claims where a second accident has caused a recurrence 
of a former injury, incurred while it was the compensa-
tion carrier. \Ve do not believe that it is the prerogative 
or the function of the Industrial Commission to set aside 
the decision of this court and announce a different rule 
of law. · This court, and not the Industrial Commission, 
determines the rule of law that shall prevail in this juris-
diction, especially when that rule has been in effect and 
unchanged for 28 y~ars. There is no dispute in the evi-
dence in this case; it conclusively appears that the acci-
dent of October 24, 1949 caused the injury in question. 
That accident was the beginning and the cause of the 
rupture corrected by the operation of Doctor Holbrook 
in November, 1950. The injury was not caused by the 
accident of July 18. It existed prior to that time. Even if 
it could be assumed that the injury had become quiescent, 
the July 18 accident merely resulted in a recurrence of 
the former injury. The evidence is without dispute that 
all that the accident of July 18 did was to aggravate an 
already existing injury. It did not cause the injury. The 
operation was required to correct the injury caused by 
the accident in 1949. 
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"The aggravation theory," which the Industrial 
Commision says (R. 82) is too well established "to re-
quire extended comment or case citation," is not defined 
by the Commission, and there is no way of determining 
from its decision what it means by "the aggravation 
theory." There is no rule in this state that the second 
employer and his insurance carrier must pay compensa-
tion for an injury that occurred at a former time and 
place when the same is aggravated or a recurrence occurs 
at a later time. 
"The aggravation theory" holds that an employee 
suffering from an existing bodily condition which is 
aggravated or lighted up by an accident is entitled to 
compensation. That is not the rule of law applicable to 
the situation present in the case at bar. The Commission 
was wrong in attempting to decide this case by the appli-
cation of the so-called "aggravation theory." 
CONCLUSION 
The award of the Industrial Commission should be 
set aside. 
Respectfully submitted. 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR., 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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